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Continuing Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases
Otto Miller III*
T HIS PAPER DIsCUSSES whether or not a divorce court, by
granting a continuing order for support and/or alimony,
thereby retains such jurisdiction over the person that it need
only give notice by mail or publication before reducing an arrear-
age to a lump sum judgment' which, under "due process," is en-
titled to full faith and credit in the courts of sister States.2 It is
assumed that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant at the time the order for support and/or alimony was
originally granted.3
An action at law is generally terminated with the final decree
of judgment, and the court after a time (after term or time for
appeal) loses jurisdiction.4 But in equity often the justice of the
case requires that there be inserted in the decree some recog-
nition of a right to further relief at a later date.5 The majority of
jurisdictions recognize these principles. Therefore, in divorce
cases they usually hold that the relief is generally equitable in
nature, and that for the purpose of alimony the court retains
jurisdiction after the final decree of divorce, and that the parties
remain in court even though they may change their domiciles or
residences. 6
* Law Clerk to Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio; a graduate
of Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Member of the Ohio Bar.
1 The alternative is to sue on the decree, Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U. S.)
582 (1858), but this method has been limited to installments granted the
courts of States where the right to receive the installment is absolute and
"* * * does not obtain where by law of the state in which a judgment for
future alimony is rendered the right to demand and receive such future
alimony is discretionary with the court which rendered the decree * * * "
Sistane v. Sistane, 218 U. S. 1 (1910); and see Note, 22 U. Chicago L. R. 246
(1954-55) for a more complete analysis of this method.
2 "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, rec-
ords, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Art. IV, #1, Const. of
U. S. Also see, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees, Present Doctrine
and Possible Changes, 9 Vand. L. R. 1 (1955).
3 Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948); and
Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555, 68 S. Ct. 1221, 92 L. Ed. 1572 (1948),
recognizing the divisibility of decrees of divorce from those for payment
of alimony, and holding that alimony can only be granted when there is
jurisdiction in personam.
4 Tichenor v. Collins, 45 N. J. L. 123 (1883).
5 2 Danl. Ch. 1014 (Am. Ed. of 1865).
6 168 A. L. R. 232-241.
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The question of continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case was
before the Vermont Supreme Court in the case of Cukor v.
Cukor.7 In the Cukor case the defendant and plaintiff were hus-
band and wife. The plaintiff wife obtained a divorce in New
York in 1930. Both parties were then domiciled in the State of
New York, and personal service of the petition was made on the
defendant. The decree of divorce included an order for alimony
in the sum of $65.00 a week. The defendant did not comply with
the order, but moved to Vermont and became a resident there.
On application of the plaintiff, the New York Court issued an
order that the defendant show cause why an entry of judgment
should not be entered against him for the arrears of alimony.
Under the rules of the New York Court, the order was made
returnable on a date certain. The order recited that the defend-
ant was a resident of Sharon, Vermont, and it directed that the
service of the order to show cause and papers upon which it was
based should be made by mailing true copies thereof by regis-
tered mail (return receipt requested) addressed to the defendant
in Vermont. The defendant received a copy of the notice, as
evidenced by the return receipt, but he made no appearance.
The hearing was had and a lump sum judgment was rendered.
The plaintiff then sued upon that judgment in Vermont.
Upon the defendant's contention that the New York Court
did not have jurisdiction, the Vermont Court held that a sum-
mons is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, where it
gives notice according to the statutory requirements with such
particularity as not to deceive or mislead; that a final judgment
does not terminate a matrimonial action where there is a pro-
vision for alimony; and that due process does not require that
personal service be made upon a party where the proceeding is
only a continuation of litigation which is already within the
jurisdiction of the court.
The Vermont Court carefully examined the New York pro-
cedure and found that in New York, as in most other jurisdic-
tions, including Ohio," it is necessary that an order for support
or alimony, payable in installments, be reduced to a lump sum
judgment as to unpaid installments before an execution can law-
fully be levied. The Court then concluded that, since this was
necessary, the Court had either expressly or impliedly reserved
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, so as to be able to
carry its order into effect.
" 114 Vt. 456, 49 A. 2d 206, 168 A. L. R. 227 (1946).
8 See Roach v. Roach, 164 0. S. 587, 59 0. 0. 1, 132 N. E. 2d 742 (1956).
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In coming to this decision the Vermont Court in part relied
upon Durlacher v. Durlacher.9 In that case the defendant, who
was then a resident of Nevada, had received the notice that a
lump sum judgment was to be rendered. He appeared specially
and contested the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that no
personal service had been made upon him. In holding that a
final judgment does not terminate a matrimonial action as to
alimony if there is a provision for such alimony in the judgment,
the New York Court said "A judgment directing the payment of
monthly alimony by defendant to plaintiff was not affected by
defendant's subsequent change of residence or absence from the
state."
The New York Court held, in effect, that the notice was
constitutional, and that it did not provide for a new judgment.
It held further that its only purpose was to furnish a means of
effective enforcement of an old judgment, giving the plaintiff
no new rights, and adding nothing to the defendant's burden.
Such a lump sum judgment, therefore, should not be considered
to be the result of a new and independent action, but merely a
further step taken in the original matrimonial action.
These two decisions demonstrate that, as far as the courts
of some jurisdictions are concerned, there is a principle of con-
tinuing jurisdiction in divorce actions, and that due process does
not require that personal service be made upon the party, because
the proceeding is only a continuation of litigation which was
initially within the jurisdiction of the court. But some notice
must be given.
In Griffin v. Griffin1 a lump sum judgment for arrearage in
alimony was awarded, with no notice to the husband. The United
States Supreme Court held that this was contrary to the re-
quirements of due process, as it divested him of the benefits of
defenses, such as payment, which he might have had. The
Supreme Court held that any reasonable notice, though not per-
sonal service, was required, saying:
"It is immaterial whether petitioner at the time of the 1938
proceedings was a domiciled resident of New York, either
within or temporarily without the state, or a resident of some
other jurisdiction. In any event a judgment in personam
directing execution to issue against petitioner, and thus
purporting to cut off all available defenses could not be
rendered in any theory of the state's power over him, with-
9 173 Misc. 329, 17 N. Y. Supp. 2d 643 (1940).
10 327 U. S. 220, 66 S. Ct. 556, 90 L. Ed. 635 (1946).
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out some form of notice by person or substituted service."
(Emphasis added.)
Two years after the decision in Griffin v. Griffin the District
of Columbia Circuit Court decided the case of Sewell v. Trimble."
The Court there relied upon the holding in Griffin v. Griffin,
supra: "it follows that only 'some form of notice by person or
substituted service' was necessary . . . ... There a wife had ob-
tained a divorce in which her husband had been personally
served. The District Court was held to have had jurisdiction of
the wife's subsequent motion for arrears for maintenance of child
of the parties, although notice of the motion was given to the
husband only by publication. The reason given was that original
jurisdiction continued as long as was necessary in order to make
effective the court's orders and decrees in respect to custody, care
and maintenance of the child.
Most of the cases which have questioned the propriety of
such proceedings arise out of New York judgments. A descrip-
tion of that procedure is explained in Rice v. Rice.12 There a suit
for separate maintenance was filed in New York, both parties
were residents, and the defendant was personally served. The
defendant failed to make payments. The plaintiff filed a motion,
without notice, for judgment for the amount of the installments
in arrears. Upon hearing the arrearage was ascertained to
amount to $840.00. The defendant did not appear. The Court
then issued an order that the defendant appear on a date cer-
tain, to show cause why an order should not be made directing
the Clerk of Court to enter a money judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the amount in arrears. This order, and an affidavit
of the plaintiff setting forth that the sum of $840.00 was due,
was then mailed to the defendant in Arkansas, by registered air
mail. The Arkansas Court held that an order to docket a judg-
ment for arrears in alimony payments, due under a judgment
for separate maintenance, was a proceeding to enforce a liability
previously adjudged. Hence it held that service of a summons,
as in an original suit to establish liability, was not required. It
was sufficient, said the Arkansas Court, if there was some form
of notice, by personal or substituted service, of the motion to
docket judgment.
11 172 F. 2d 27 (C. A., D. C., 1948).
12 213 Ark. 981, 214 S. W. 2d 235 (1948). Later Mrs. Rice obtained an in-
crease in the amount of the weekly award, from $15.00 to $100.00, in the
New York Court, by constructive service. She reduced this amount to a
lump sum judgment in 1951 and successfully sued upon it in Arkansas. See
Rice v. Rice, 222 Ark. 639, 262 S. W. 2d 270 (1953).
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The Arkansas Court then went on to say that the method
used by New York was very similar to its own procedure, 13 and
that in examining Griffin v. Griffin, supra, they were sure that
service of the notice by mail was good "substituted service."
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in
Kase v. Kase14 has gone so far as to hold that, where a motion
is filed to change an order in a divorce suit from "divorce only"
to "divorce and alimony," twenty years after the divorce was
granted on a petition and prayer for general relief but none for
alimony, that the notice need only convey the requisite informa-
tion and afford a reasonable time for appearance, with due regard
to the practicalities and peculiarities of the case. They held that
personal service of the notice was not necessary. Although the
New Jersey courts in this case have gone further than most
courts, by holding that an application for alimony can properly
be made in a summary manner at foot of a divorce decree, the
case does contain a good general review of the cases discussing
jurisdiction and notice.
An interesting English case, demonstrating the continuing
jurisdiction which British courts exercise over the status of mar-
riage, is Thynne v. Thynne.15 There a wife applied for and was
granted a divorce, upon a petition which stated that the mar-
riage had been solemnized in 1927, when in fact there had been
a prior secret marriage in 1926. She then made application to
the Court asking that the decree be amended to refer to the
i926 marriage. The Appeals Court, by Hodson, L. J., in reversing
the lower court held (on page 482): "What is dissolved is the
status, not the ceremony," and went on to hold that, as the court
has continuing jurisdiction over the parties, the summons should
issue, and the court under its inherent powers should amend
errors of fact so that all uncertainty be removed.
One of the earlier decisions in Ohio which discusses this
problem is Whitaker v. Whitaker.16 In that case the wife had
obtained a decree for "alimony only," and later submitted to
the jurisdiction of a divorce court in Oregon, which granted the
divorce and custody of the children to the wife but did not grant
any alimony. She then came back to Ohio and tried to obtain a
lump sum judgment on the Ohio "alimony only" decree, by
13 The same is true in most jurisdictions. See Note, 22 U. Chicago L. R. 246
(1954-5).
14 18 N. J. S. 12, 86 A. 2d 587 (1952).
15 3 W. L. R. 465 (1955).
16 52 0. A. 223, 60. 0. 316, 3 N. E. 2d 667 (1936).
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giving notice to the defendant by publication. The Court of
Appeals of Cuyahoga County, in holding that service by publica-
tion upon her non-resident husband will not give the court juris-
diction to grant a personal judgment against such a defendant,
was much more concerned about the fact that she had submitted
to the jurisdiction of another court than it was about the type
of notice. Judge Terrell wrote a strong dissent as to the refusal
of the Court to examine the notice with reference to the alimony
due before the divorce in Oregon was granted. He found that
there had been personal service in the first instance, and then
held that the jurisdiction is a continuing jurisdiction, that there
was proper notice, and that the defendant had had ample oppor-
tunity to appear and to contest the granting of the motion, that
he did appear and object, and that since jurisdiction was con-
tinuing the Court should have heard the motion and reduced to
judgment the unpaid installments up to the time of the divorce. 17
The Ohio Supreme Court spoke of the continuing jurisdiction
of a divorce court in Corbett v. Corbett,i8 wherein they held
that there was continuing jurisdiction so long as the decree pro-
vides for the custody, care and support of minor children. They
then held that the proper way to modify the order was by motion
in the original case. The method of serving the notice was not
discussed.
The first time the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the type
of notice necessary in cases involving continued jurisdiction was
in the 1956 case of Van Divort v. Van Divort,19 where it was held,
in the following syllabi, that:
"3. Under the continuing jurisdiction of the court in a divorce
action, the filing of an application or motion for a modifica-
tion of an order or decree for care, custody and support of
minor children of the parties is not the institution of a new
or original proceeding but of one ancillary and incidental to
the original action, an& no new service of summons on a
party is necessary to give the court jurisdiction to make
further orders as to minor-child support, regardless of the
place of residence of such party.
"4. In the absence of statutory procedure for the notification
of a party to a divorce action of the filing of an application
17 The propriety of this dissent as regards service by publication under
present Ohio law is questionable, as the State statute authorizing service by
publication is limited in its aspects and must be strictly construed. Ohio
R. C., Sec. 2703.14; Johnson v. Johnson, 31 0. 0. 122 (1945).
Is 123 0. S. 76, 174 N. E. 10 (1930).
19 165 0. S. 141, 134 N. E. 2d 115 (1956); discussed in 8 West. Res. L. R. 315
(1956).
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or motion by the other party for a modification of a decree
for the care, custody or support of minor children of the
parties, the court may, within its sound discretion, make
rules for the service of notice of such application or motion,
and, where the court adopts a rule providing for the service
of writs or process by mail pursuant to, in accordance with,
and to the extent permitted by Section 11297-1, General
Code (Section 2703.23, Revised Code), providing for the
service of writs or process, and service on a party of notice
of such an application or motion is made by mail in accord-
ance with such rule, whereby such party receives actual
notice of such application or motion, the court has jurisdic-
tion to consider such application or motion and to modify
such decree."
It is interesting to note that the syllabi in the Ohio Supreme
Court case differ from those in the Appellate Court. 20 The Su-
preme Court seems to have narrowed the question, and to have
answered only that question which was necessary in the case
before it, while the Appellate Court answered the broader ques-
tion of continuing jurisdiction. 21
In every jurisdiction examined, where a court sends its notice
by certified or registered mail and requires that a return receipt
be obtained before jurisdiction is exercised, sufficient actual
notice is given, and a court need only determine if the time
given in the notice is sufficient under all the circumstances of the
case to allow the defendant to enter his appearance and challenge
20 In Ohio Supreme Court cases the syllabus of the case is the law of the
case, as it is prepared by the judge assigned to prepare the opinion; while in
other appellate cases the syllabi are not always prepared by the court, and
one must look to the text of the case for the law. See 14 0. Jur. 2d 681,
Courts, #247 et seq.
21 The syllabus of the Appellate case is as follows:
"1. Support orders, whether or not they so provide, are the subject of
the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be modified upon proper
application whenever the character and circumstances of the case or the
parties require.
"2. A trial court in a divorce action retains jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant as well as the subject matter of the action.
"3. Sections 2309.67 to 2309.69, inclusive, Revised Code, dealing with
notice of a motion and the service thereof, do not control the method of
service of a notice of a motion to modify a support order in a divorce case.
"4. The purpose of notice is to establish knowledge; and a defendant,
upon receipt of notice, is charged with the knowledge that the court which
made the original support money order had continuing jurisdiction of his
person and the continuing right to change the original order."
Van Divort v. Van Divort, 100 0. A. 500, 60 0. 0. 392, 137 N. E. 2d 684
(1955).
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the claims of the plaintiff. 22 The same is true in many jurisdic-
tions where the notice is given by publication.
Thus many of the cases, including those before the United
States Supreme Court, seem to hold that the doctrine of con-
tinuing jurisdiction in divorce cases is here to stay. However, in
order to satisfy due process requirements, so far as support
and/or alimony are concerned, notice must be given; but the
type of notice which is necessary is not as important as is the
requirement that the defendant be given a fair opportunity to
challenge the claims of the plaintiff.
22 The discussion here has been limited to continuing jurisdiction so far as
alimony is concerned, and there seems to be a conflict of authority as to
continuing jurisdiction over custody of children. See Cunningham v. Cun-
ningham, 166 0. S. 203 (1957), where the Court distinguished Van Divort
v. Van Divort, supra, n. 21, and held the welfare of the child to be the
primary concern of the Court; but to the contrary, Lanctot v. Lanctot, 125
Wash. 310, 216 P. 356 (1923), where the Court recognized the principle that
the welfare of the child is to be the primary consideration of the court, but
held that there was continuing jurisdiction in the Ohio Court, and felt that
it should not determine that the findings of the Ohio Court would not be in
the best interests of the child. Also on this same question see Hersey v.
Hersey, 371 Mass. 545, 171 N. E. 815 (1930); Burns v. Shaply, 16 Ala. App.
297, 77 S. 447 (1918), and note, 4 J. Publ. L. 206 (1955).
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